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                                                                 Abstract 
 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) started in 1998 an extraordinarily easy monetary policy to 
conquer the prolonged depression which Japanese economy had not experienced before. 
The economy was on the verge of financial panic, especially in 1997 and 1998, when major 
financial institutions failed. The article clears how the Japanese economy fell into the 
serious depression. We discuss the role of BOJ in the emergence of the prolonged 
depression. A cointegration test is performed for the relationship between money stock and 
real economy in Japan in years 1980-2003. The BOJ argued recently that the relationship is 
difficult to discern after the burst of financial bubble of 1990’s. Our results show that the 
cointegration still holds even with the sample beyond 1997 if we take financial anxieties 
also into consideration. The financial anxieties are quantified by conditional variances from 
EGARCH model.  Its behavior can be rationalized by the economic events since 1975. We 
will conclude with a suggestion that the BOJ should have paid more attention to the 
behavior of money stock at the early stages of depression of the 1990s.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Japan’s economy has experienced since early 1990’s the prolonged recession which has never been 
observed before. The recession is characterized by rapid decline in assets prices which substantially 
accumulated the nonperforming loans. The mounting nonperforming loans, especially in the 
financial sectors, hampered the normal functions of financial intermediaries, and drove Japan’s 
economy on the verge of financial panic. The financial distress and deflation is rooted in the so-
called bubble economy of the latter half of the 1980s when the economy experienced a stormy 
expansion in assets prices. The first part of the article will focus on how the strong economy 
deteriorated and how the authority, especially the Bank of Japan (BOJ) responded to this. The 
period of interest will be divided into 2 periods, before and after the burst of the bubble. In the 
second part of the paper, the formal statistical test will be performed to examine the relationship 
between money and economic activity in Japan 1980-2003. The BOJ had insisted that the 
relationship became harder to discern and downgraded the role of money stock. However the result 
will show that there still remains a cointegration between them, just taking into consideration the 
financial anxieties. The conclusion will come with reflections on the role of the BOJ in the 
emergence of the prolonged recession.       
 
Many people thought the deep recession was a reoccurrence of the Great Depression of 1930s 
especially in 1997-98 when major banks and securities failed and Japan Premium was imposed in 
the international money market. The BOJ adopted so–called zero interest rate policy in 1999 by 
providing enough money to the interbank money market to reduce its rate to almost zero percent. 
As it did not boost the economy, the BOJ decided to take an untraditional reserve target policy to 
combat against the serious depression in March 2001. These gradually increased the outstanding 
balance of current account held at the Bank from five trillion yen which is enough to meet the 
required reserve of private banks. The balance reached at 35 trillion yen at last in 2004.  
 
At the Monetary Policy Meeting held on July 14, 2006, the Bank of Japan decided to end the 
untraditional easy monetary policy, so-called quantity easy policy which had started on March 15 
2001 by putting the bank reserve on its target. Various economic indicators show that the economy 
is likely to expand for a substantial period, according to the Outlook Report released on April 28, 
2006. The core CPI, which excludes volatile food prices but includes gasoline and heating oil prices 
tend to rapidly increase.  
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II. The background of asset price bubble in the second half of 1980s. 
We have to return back 1985 to understand why the Japanese economy had experienced the asset 
price bubble in hindsight. The Japanese economy is basically an export-dependent because of lack 
of natural resources. The government, chiefly MITI (the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry), supported and fostered the export-oriented industries by various measures. Consequently 
the Japanese economy often caused trade friction especially with United States. Especially after the 
oil shock in 1973, Japanese industries promoted the exports due to the shrinking domestic market. 
However Japanese yen rapidly appreciated after the Japanese currency system changed form the 
fixed rate to the floating rate in 1974. The industries made great efforts to overcome the difficult 
situations caused by the highly appreciated yen. Many industries concentrated on high technology 
to increase their productivity. As a result Japanese export increased in spite of highly appreciated 
yen. 
 
The trade friction between Japan and U.S got worse year by year after the President Ronald Reagan 
took his office and started so-called Reaganomics by adopting monetarist and supply side policies. 
His policy targeting low inflation rate and strong dollar caused twin deficit of trade and budget in 
U.S. The U.S trade deficit with Japan accounted for over half of its total trade deficit in 1980s. US 
congress took very hard stance to Japan’s increasing trade surplus and threatened with retaliating 
trade measures. 
 
The Minister of Finance and governor of the central bank of G5 countries (United States, United 
Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Japan) gathered to Plaza Hotel in New York in 1985. They 
discussed how to correct the trade imbalance between U.S and Japan and West Germany, especially 
how to reduce the huge trade deficit in U.S. G5 countries agreed to concert to depreciate the high 
dollar in the meeting. The cooperative interest reduction had begun. In 1985, a long-term interest 
rate in U.S was 10.8 percent, while that in Japan was 5.8 percent. The difference was 4.7 percent as 
shown in Figure 2 when the exchange rate was 250s yen per dollar. In August 1986, US’s interest 
rate was reduced to 7.3 percent while Japan’s rate was 5.2 percent. The difference was reduced to 
2.1 percent, which caused the rapid yen’s depreciation from 250s to 150s (see Figure 1). However 
Japanese current account balance did not decrease in spite of the yen’s appreciation. US 
government was afraid that the further appreciation of the yen would make the Japanese economy 
so stagnant and would be counter productive to the U.S economy. Japanese economy was in the 
slight recession after Plaza agreement due to the high yen. So U.S gave the pressure to stimulate the 
Japan’s domestic demand and to raise the imports. 
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                            Figure 1.  Exchange Rate, yen/dollar (BOJ) 
 
         Figure 2.  Long-term Interest Rate Difference, US and Japan (1985-89)                      
 
 the Louvre agreement (February 1987), Japan was demanded to take further step in to easy 
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monetary policy. BOJ reduced the official discount rate to 2.5 percent while US increased the 
discount rate to 6.0 percent as shown in Figure 3.  As a result, the difference between the long-term 
interest rate in US and that in Japan expanded from 2.2 percent to 4.5 percent which depreciated 
yen to the normal level (140 yens). 
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             Figure 3.  Official Discount Rate US and Japan (1985-2004) 
oney growth started to rise in 1987 Q1. It increased more than 10 percent from 1987 Q1 through 
 reason why only Japan had to keep the easy monetary policy is as follows. The dollar was still 
nder the assumption of affluent funds available, banks were very aggressive and competitive in 
to manage the household by borrowing money from the banks. 
                                                
  
 
 
M
1990 Q2 (see Figure 4). This was the beginning of the Japanese asset bubble.  Some felt that the 
low discount rate and rapid increase of money growth might cause the inflation. However a market 
crash had happened in New York in October 1987. G7 countries decided to cooperate to take easy 
monetary policy to avoid the world depression. As a result, Japan had to keep the low interest rate 
policy. Contrary to this the Bundesbank raised the discount rate and returned its monetary policy to 
the neutral level (4.5 percent).  
     
The
weak to the Japanese yen. It was thought that the dollar would rapidly depreciate and bond and 
stock prices would substantially decrease and lead to depression in US if the BOJ raise the discount 
rate. People thought the BOJ would never take the tight policy and the easy policy would continue 
for a long time1. 
 
U
loan markets. Anybody could get loans very easily from the banks as long as they had land as the 
collateral. Large firms could get funds easily by using “equity finances”. Banks tried to expand the 
loans to household and small firms which had not enough collateral. Even housewives were advised 
 
1 See Suzuki (1993) in more detail.  
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                            Figure 4.  Money Growth Rate (year on year ) 
.1 4
   
                                Figure 5.    Stock Price ( Nikkei 225) 
                            
                                      
                             
- .0 2
.0 0
.0 2
.0 4
.0 6
.0 8
.1 0
.1 2
8 0 8 2 8 4 8 6 8 8 9 0 9 2 9 4 9 6 9 8 0 0 0 2
D E L T A M
4 0 0 0 0
0
5 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
1 5 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0
2 5 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0
3 5 0 0 0
1 9 7 0 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2 0 0 0
s to c k  p r i c e
 5
 
                            Figure 6.  Land Price (year on year) 
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Both the stock and land prices rapidly increased from 1988 through 1989 as shown in Figure 5 and 
6. This can not be explained rationally by the fundamentals. The hike of assets prices did not 
respond to the first rise of the discount rate in May 1988 from 2.5 to 3.25 percent and to the second 
rise in January 1989 from 3.25 to 3.75 percent at all. The bullish expectation dispelled the negative 
effects on the asset prices. The asset prices kept increasing. 
 
III. The prolonged recession after the burst of bubble 
 
The BOJ implemented the third rise of discount rate from 3.75 to 4.25 percent in December 1989 
when a new governor of BOJ Yasuo Mieno took his office. However the market was still bullish. 
Land and stock prices continued to rise. Mieno showed very strong stance to the bullish economy 
by fourth rise of discount rate from 4.25 to 5.25 percent1. He took also the role of arbitrage of assets 
prices2. Furthermore the governor Mieno implemented the fifth rise of discount rate to 6.0 percent 
to avoid the homemade inflation caused by the Gulf War in August 1990 (see Figure A1 in 
Appendix A). In addition the government also placed a ceiling on the total amount of financing 
availed for real estate purchase.  
                                                 
1 New governor Mieno was called a “Heisei no Onihei”, who had strongly fought against the gangs as a 
leader of police officers in the Edo period more than 200 years ago. 
2 Nowadays many economists consider that central bank should not take the role of the arbitrage of 
asset prices. See Randal Parker (2002). 
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The burst of the bubble began at last. Money stock (M2+CD) rapidly declined until mid 1992 
(Figure 4). After hitting a record high of 38,915 yen at the end of 1989, the stock price rapidly 
began to decline. In August 1992, stock price dipped below 15,000 yen, a 63 percent plunge from 
peak level. Land prices began to fall after hitting a peak in September 1990 and they are still falling 
(Figure 6). In response to the asset price decline, the BOJ reduced the discount rate six times from 
July 1991 to February 1993. The discount rate was ultimately reduced from 6.0 percent to 2.5 
percent (see Figure 3). The government also implemented the fiscal stimulus by spending a total of 
29.9 trillion yen in two years from 1992 to 1993.   
 
Though the economy showed the signs of a slight recovery because of the active policies in 1994, 
some adverse factors hampered the economy. The highly appreciated yen damaged the export 
industries. Yen reached at record high level of 79.75 yen per dollar on April 19, 1995. In addition, 
the great earthquake attacked Kansai districts and seriously damaged its economy in 1995. Land 
and stock prices were promoted to decline. Prices, especially wholesale prices, continued to decline 
and increased the deflationary pressure (see Figure A1). Firms were obliged to continue the 
adjustment of their balance sheet damaged by the decline of assets price. Under these conditions, 
the BOJ continued to decline the discount rate from 1.75 to 0.5 percent successively (Figure 3). 
However these policy measures were not enough to recover the economy in hindsight.  
 
Okada and Iida (2004) compared the movement of actual monetary base growth with that of 
adequate monetary base growth based on the McCallum policy reaction rule as shown in Figure 73.  
According to their results, adequate monetary growth rate remained less than actual monetary 
growth in the bubble period from the half of 1980s. On the contrary, the adequate base growth was 
consistently exceeding the actual base growth indicating that the volume of monetary base remained 
insufficient since 1991.The results suggest that monetary policy was too easy in the latter half of 
1980s and too tight since 1991. It also not responded properly to the external shock which affected 
the Japanese economy.  
 
The Prime Minister Hashimoto who worried about the future of government finances implemented 
measures to reconstruct the Japanese finance. He was afraid that fiscal condition would get worse 
and worse with the coming of aging society in Japan. He decided to increase the consumption tax 
                                                 
3 The base growth rule was computed under the assumption that target rate of nominal GDP is 5 
percent (3 percent real GDP growth and 2 percent inflation). For more details see Okada and Iida (2004).  
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from 3 to 5 percent and abolished a special income tax cut in April 1997, which amounted to a tax 
increase of 9 trillion yen. It reminds us of Herbert Hoover who increased the tax in the midst of the 
depression in 1930s. Consumption rapidly shrunk responding to Hashimoto’s tax increase policy. 
Unfortunately to the Japanese economy, the East Asian economic crises occurred in July 1997. The 
fiscal contraction compounded by Asian crisis decreased the aggregate demand in Japan 
substantially.  
 
       Figure 7 Adequate and Actual Growth Rate (Okada & Iida 2004) 
                                   
 
                          
Under these deflationary conditions, the financial panic occurred. Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one 
of the largest city banks in Japan, and Yamaichi Securities Company, one of Japan’s largest security 
companies, failed in November 1997. The failure of both big financial institutes sent the signs that 
the government gave up the “too big to fail” policy. People thought no financial institutes were 
immune from failures. Rumors about the other banks’ failure had spread out through Japan. The 
stock prices of many financial institutes sharply declined and “Japan premium” in the international 
money market jumped by around 100 basis points. Japanese banks were obliged to pay the 
additional basis points for raising funds in the oversea financial markets. The premium is calculated 
as the difference between the quoted rates of TIBOR in the Tokyo offshore market and LIBOR in 
the London offshore market. Bonds issued not only by Japanese financial institutions but also by 
Japanese government were downgraded by international credit-rating agencies.  
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In response to the serious situation, the government decided to provide 30 trillion yen funds by 
he government actually injected 1.8 trillion yen to 21 large banks to raise their capital ratio in 
he government hesitated to quickly resolve the nonperforming loans and bank problems. This 
he signs of deflation were apparent (Figure A1). In response to the serious situation, both the BOJ 
he BOJ adopted further easy monetary policy by reducing the call rate to 0.25 percent in 1998 (see 
                                                
issuing bonds. The government was not willing to inject the public funds into the problem banks by 
considering the negative sentiments of the congress and public at first. However the financial panic 
was so severe that neither the congress nor the public strongly opposed to inject the public funds to 
assist the problem banks. The 30 trillion yen was divided into the following two category, 13 
trillion yen was prepared for the enforcement of the Deposit Insurance System, while the remaining 
17 trillion yen was intended for the capital injection of the problem financial institutes.   
 
T
March 1998. However it had no significant effect on the banks because it was lax. Long-Term 
Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank failed in 1998 after the injection of public fund. 7.5 trillion 
yen was again injected in March in 1999. The implementation was quite deferent from the former 
injection. Banks were strongly required to submit detailed and meaningful restructuring plan4.  
 
T
weakened financial institutes and caused long recession. The government officially announced in 
late 1995 that nonperforming loan totaled 38 trillion yen, 4 percent of outstanding all loans. In 
1998, nonperforming loans increased at 73.1 trillion yen, 12 percent of all loans or 10 percent of 
GDP. The efforts by the government and private banks to decrease nonperforming loans did not 
succeed because of the severe deflationary pressures.  
 
T
and the government admitted at last that Japanese economy had fallen into the deflation. The 
Japanese economy was thus caught in a vicious circle, so-called deflationary spiral indicated by 
Irving Fisher (1933). GDP recorded negative growth for 5 consecutive quarters from the 1997 Q4 
onward (for the first time since the start of GDP statistics in 1955). 
 
T
Figure A2). The BOJ also took the so-called zero interest policy by reducing it to virtually zero 
percent in February 1999. Furthermore the BOJ adopted the untraditional monetary policy, so-
called quantity easy policy by putting the bank reserve on its target. Owing to the expansionary 
 
4 See M. Hutchison and K. McDill (1999) p. 66. 
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policy, the financial panic settled down. The Japanese economy began to show the sign of the 
recovery. 
  
In spite of the BOJ’s efforts, money supply not increased so much as shown in Figure 4, because 
                                
where M = money supply, H = monetary base, C = cash, D = bank deposit, and R = bank reserve. 
                                Figure 8.  Money Multiplier 
rivate banks were under pressure to meet the international BIS standard. The increase of 
money multiplier rapidly decreased. Its behavior is depicted in Figure 8. The reasons why money 
multiplier declined are as follows. Money multiplier can be calculated as  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
                
 
P
nonperforming loans contributed to the decline of their capital. Internationally operating banks are 
required to maintain an 8 percent capitalization for risk-weighted assets. Other banks limited to the 
domestic operation are required to meet 4 percent. Banks with deteriorated balance sheets were 
obliged to reduce the commercial loan as shown in Figure 9, because the rise of risk asset decreased 
their own capital ratio. They tried to increase the reserve ratio (see Figure A3). On the other hand, 
both firms and household increased cash holdings which increased cash-deposit ratio. Thus, the rise 
of both of C/D and R/D contributed to the decline of money multiplier.   
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                      Figure 9.  Bank Loan Growth Rate (year on year) 
V.  The relationship between money and economic activity 
the economic activity in 
e perform a formal cointegration test to examine whether or not there exists a long-run 
 
.0 2
 
 
 
I
 
n 2003 BOJ strongly questioned the relationship between money and I
Japan. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, in spite of two oil shocks, long-run relationship with 
both stability and causality can be observed between the money stock and the real economy and 
also between the money stock and prices in Japan. However, with the emergence of the bubble in 
the latter half of the 1980s, the relationship between them became harder to discern.  We depict the 
relationship between money and real GDP with the scatter diagram in Figure 10.  We confirm the 
stable relationship between them before 1997. However two variables seem to diverge year by year 
after 1997. 
 
W
equilibrium relationship between the money stock and the economic activity in Japan. We focus on 
the relationship between three variables: the real money stock, real GDP, and the opportunity cost 
of money measured as the difference between the interest rates on the money stock and other 
financial assets. If a long-run equilibrium relationship exists between the real money stock, real 
GDP, and the opportunity cost, money demand should rise in line with an increase in real GDP or 
with a decline in the opportunity cost.  
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             Figure 10. Relation Between Real Money and Real GDP 1981-2001 
he system model is described by the following VECM5: 
       Δrmt = cm0 + αm ectt-1 + mi Δrmt-i + 
 
 
T
 
 
1
kΣ c 1kΣ dmi Δyt-i + 1kΣ e  miΔrt-i + εm,t     (1) 
        Δyt = cy0 + αy ectt-1 + yi Δrmt-1 + 
 
 
1
kΣ c 1kΣ dyi Δyt-i + 1kΣ e  yiΔrt-i + εy,t        (2) 
        Δrt = cr0 + αr ectt-1 + ri Δrmt-i + 
 
 
1
kΣ c 1kΣ dri Δyt-i + 1kΣ e  riΔrt-i + εr,t          (3) 
        ectt = rmt + βyyt + βrrt + const.                                                         (4) 
where  rmt  is real money stock,  yt  is real GDP, rt   is opportunity cost, and  ectt   is 
 
Our results of cointegration test were as follows. 
                                                
  
 
   
 
 
an error correction term  
 
 
 
5 We implemented both DF-GLS test and KPSS test to check whether variables are stationary or non-
stationary. All variables including financial anxieties (DV1, defined later) were shown to be non-
stationary and their first differences were stationary.  Test results will be shown upon request.  
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1. A long-run equilibrium relationship between real money stock, real GDP, and the 
 
. However, the long-run equilibrium relationship can no longer be detected in the 
 
he reason why the relationship between the money stock and economic activity has been unstable 
us we need to comprise a new variable to explain the rise of precautionary demand for money 
 used an EGARCH model in which a change of corporate financial position ( ) is regressed 
an b
opportunity cost can be found in the sample period before late 1997. 
2
sample period expanded beyond late 1997, when financial anxieties over the 
Japanese financial system emerged. 
 
T
seems to be related to the financial anxiety which rapidly increased after the sudden collapse of big 
financial institutes in 1997 and 1998. The financial anxieties drastically increased the precautionary 
money demand by both the firms and households.  
    
Th
after 1997. The new variable has to capture the psychological change of people due to the financial 
anxieties. We used the Corporate Financial Position Diffusion Index issued quarterly by Bank of 
Japan known as TANKAN in order to qualify the unobservable variable.  
    
We tDIΔ
by a change of bank lending rate ( trateΔ )6. 2th  is the financial anxieties which c e captured as 
the conditional variance of tε . The e tion sult is as follows. 
 
stima  re
                                    t t 1
0.0446 0.0037 0.0236 ,
(0.18) ( 0.37)     ( 2.26)
t tDI rate rate ε−Δ = − Δ − Δ +
− −  
                                                 
6 Kimura and Fujita (1999) used the following TARCH model: 
1
2
1
2
1
2
110
2
−−−− +++= ttttt Ihh γεβεαα             
Where  = 1 if 1−tI 1−tε < 0 
         = 0 otherwise 
In this model, for TARCH effect, the asymmetry termγ  > 0 and the condition for non-negativity 
will be 0α ≥ 0, 1α ≥ 0, β  ≥ 0 and .01 ≥+ γα  The conditional variance  is subject to an impact 2th 1α  
from good news ( 1−tε  ≥ 0), while an impact ( γα +1 ) from bad news ( 1−tε < 0). However their result 
can not be explained rationally from economic points of view. For example financial anxieties 
increased in the bubble period in late 1980s. 
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12 2 1
1
1 1
log( ) 0.3565 0.7746log( )) 0.2249 0.168 ,
       (1.21) (4.26) (1.08) ( 1.59)
t t
t t
t t
h h
h h
ε ε− −
−
− −
= + + −
−
 
 
           where values in the parentheses are t-values. 
 
The graph of financial anxieties ( ) is given in Figure 11. Anxieties variable denoted by DV2th t =  
increase from 1992 to 1994 (the first financial anxiety in Japan), when small credit unions and 
cooperative failed because of an increase in the nonperformed loans (NPL) due the bust of the 
bubble. The Japanese economy began to show modest recovery in late 1995, when real GDP began 
to increase and the official estimation of NPLs decreased. The Ministry of Finance issued a report 
entitled “Reorganizing the Japanese Financial System” in June 1995, in which they showed diehard 
attitude to tackle with the NPLs problems by officially disclosing the magnitude of bad loans 
totalled 40 trillion yen (about 4 percent of the loans held by depository institutions).  
2
1+th
 
                                  Figure 11.  Financial Anxieties  
 
 
 
 
However, as we already discussed, the economy sharply declined in 1997 when Prime Minister 
Ryutaro Hashimoto declared the rise of the consumption tax from 3 to 5 percent and the end of 
temporary income tax cut. Major Japanese financial institutes failed. Rumours about financial panic 
spread out through Japan when government took a very negative view to use public funds to help 
affected banks. People’s anxieties tremendously increased, as indicated in the rise of DVt in 1998. 
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However DV rapidly decreased after 1999 when BOJ adopted an aggressive monetary easing 
policy. It reduced the inter-bank money rate to a new low level in February 1999. Thanks to this so-
called zero interest policy, the uncollateralized overnight call rate was lowered to 0.01 percent and 
further declined to 0.001 percent when the BOJ had took the so-called quantitative easy policy in 
March 2001 (see Figure A3). The Japanese government also decided to inject public funds in 
banking sector. The amounts are 1.8 trillion yen in 1998 and 7.8 trillion yen in 1999. Both efforts of 
the BOJ and the government succeeded in dispelling the financial anxiety.  
 
We now define the adjusted money stock as follows, by letting 2 11t tDV h +≡ , 
 
 
                                                              = ,adj trm * 1t trm k DV−   
 
 
The above system in Eqs.(1) to (4) can be rewritten as follows, by replacing the variable rmt  by a 
new rmadj,t.  
 
    0 1 ,
1 1 1
1 ( 1 )
k k k
i i i
t m m t m t m t i t i m t i m t i m t
i i i
rm c k DV ect c rm kDV d y e rα ε− − − − −
= = =
Δ = + Δ + + Δ − + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ ∑ (5)
 
   
1 1 1
1 ,t
1 1 1
( 1 )                      (6)
p p p
i i i
t yo y t y t i t i y t i y t i y
i i i
y c ect c rm k DV d y e rα ε
− − −
− − − − −
= = =
Δ = + + Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ ∑
 
     
1 1 1
0 1 ,
1 1 1
( 1 )                          (7)
p p p
i i i
t r r t r t i t i r t i r t i r t
i i i
r c ect c rm k DV d y e rα ε− − −− − − − −
= = =
Δ = + + Δ − Δ + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ ∑
 
 
           where ectt  is concerned with variables (rmt – kDV1t), yt  and rt. 
 
 
 
Parameters in Eqs.(5) to (7) were estimated with the criterion: 
 
                                      (8) 2 2 2, , ,
1
min{ ( )} . r. t. unknown  parameters
T
m t y t r t
t
wε ε ε
=
+ +∑
 
The estimation procedure is shown in Appendix B. Our results of cointegration estimation are as 
follows. Cointegration still holds when we delete the precautionary demand caused by financial 
anxiety from real money stock, even in the sample beyond 1998. The cointegration result in the 
sample from 1980q1 to 2003q2 is exemplarily exhibited in Table 1.  
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                        Figure 12.   Real Money and Adjusted Money 
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                            Table 1. Cointegration Test from 1980q1 to 2003q2 
 
Test for the number of cointegrating vectors 
 rmadj y r 
Eigenvalues 0.224 0.076 0.016 
Hypotheses r=0 r≤ 1 ≤r 2 
maxλ  22.86* 7.07 1.49 
traceλ  31.43* 8.57 1.49 
Adjustment Coefficients α  
adjrmΔ  -0.0062   
yΔ  0.0045   
rΔ  -1.46   
Normalized cointegrating coefficients β ′  
 1.00 -1.695 0.114 
        **(*) denotes rejection of hypotheses at 1%(5%) significance  level  
                   and lagged difference is decided to be n=3. 
          
 
Real money (rmt) and adjusted money stock (rmadj,t) are shown in Figure 12. The difference 
between two money stocks indicates the precautionary demand caused by financial anxiety. The big 
differences shown in around 1993 and 1998 suggest that both firms and household rapidly increased 
their money holdings facing the financial crisis. It means that there was shortage of money stock, 
although the BOJ insisted they provided enough money to the private sector by the low interest rate 
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policy. The increase of precautionary demand for money means the decline of active money which 
has positive effects on the economy. 
  
V. Conclusion 
   
In the 1970s BOJ had to learn the lesson how important it is to control the money stock at the stable 
level when the Japanese economy experienced high inflation in 1974. The BOJ rapidly increased 
money stock to combat against the adverse effects caused by the first oil shock. High growth rate of 
money caused a heavy inflation, beyond 30 percent per year. However the BOJ learnt the lesson and 
behaved well when the second oil shock occurred in 1979. The price level was very stable, though 
with very slight recession, since the BOJ kept the money growth at the moderate level. 
 
Unfortunately for the Japanese economy the BOJ forgot the lesson and increased money stock 
following the direction of government. The BOJ was under the strong pressure of U.S and Japanese 
governments which strongly demanded to take easy monetary policy to boost the domestic demand 
especially after the Louvre agreement. The BOJ increased the money stock beyond 13 percent per 
year. One reason why the BOJ kept increasing money stock is the market crash of New York in 
1987. But another more important reason is that price level was stable. The highly appreciated yen 
calmed the inflation pressures. Besides the trade liberalization of agricultural products, such as 
orange and beef, contributed to the decline of consumption price7. The BOJ should have more 
strongly insisted that the current account imbalance between Japan and U.S was originally caused 
by the structural imbalance between domestic savings and investment in the U.S economy. It should 
have been more independent of the government and should not have forgotten the lesson from the 
first oil shock. 
 
The BOJ should have also realized the scare of deflation. The BOJ had been reluctant to ease the 
money because of the fear of recurrence of the bubble economy.  At the early stage of the recession, 
the BOJ thought that some downward pressure on prices was what has been referred to as “good 
deflation,” resulting from the technical change and the increase of cheap products from China and 
deregulation in Japan’s rigid service sector8. It was often said at that time that Tokyo is the most 
expensive city in world.  One more reason is that the BOJ thought that monetary conditions were 
already extremely low which might hamper the effort of both firms and banks to adjust their 
                                                 
7 Japan opened up these agricultural products in 1988, in response to U.S strong demand. 
8 Japan had many administrative regulations. For example, it was very difficult to open new large 
stores. Department stores and large supermarkets were strongly regulated by the Large-scale Retail 
Store Law. 
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damaged balance sheets. Further “low interest policy” was thought to incur the moral hazard.  
However such BOJ’s stance provided very negative effects on the financial institutions and stock 
prices.  
 
Both the government and BOJ were reluctant to disclose the nonperforming loan statistics. They 
had still believed the “myth of ever-rising land price” in the sense that they expected the land price 
and economy to recover so soon. They thought that these problems would be rapidly improved once 
the anticipated recovery occurred. They took the forbearance policy. They published the NPLs only 
of 21 major banks in 1992. The statistics were widely admitted to underestimate the true value of 
NPLs. Such “buying time policy” made the NPL problems worsen. The Finnish economy rapidly 
recovered because of the injection of public funds immediately after its financial crisis9. If Japan 
had dissolved the nonperforming loan problems similarly at the early stage as Finland did, the credit 
crunch would have not occurred and money multiplier would have not declined substantially. Public 
funds should have been injected to revitalize the financial system before the drastic decline in 1997.  
 
The radical contraction of money stock in 1990 tells us that monetary policy should not be used to 
change the asset prices. The central bank should not take the role of arbitrages of asset prices. We 
have to remember that it takes lot of time to revitalize the economy once it falls into the recession. 
We have learned also that there still exists a cointegration between money stock and the real 
economic activity even in Japan after the burst of the bubble. As Milton Friedman said, both 
inflation and deflation are monetary phenomenon in the long-run. The BOJ should have paid a close 
attention to the behavior of money stock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See P. Nyberg and V. Vihriala (1993). 
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                               Figure A1. Inflation Rate (GDP deflator) 
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Appendix B:   Estimation Procedures 
 
[Case-1](no cointegration)  If cointegration property does not hold, then Eqs.(5) to (7) without 
 can be estimated as a nonlinear estimation and estimated k produce a new money variable 
rm
1tect −
adj,t. 
[Case-2](cointegration)  If cointegration property holds, then the following algorithm is applied to 
estimate the parameters c1 and c2. 
 
(i) Set initial value of k.  
(ii) Calculate a new variable rmadj,t ≡ rmt – kDV1t. 
(iii) Calculate VECM and an error correction term ectt-1 for variables rmadj,t , yt and rt  in Eqs. 
(5) to (7). 
(iv) Insert ectt-1 into Eqs.(5) to (7) and estimate k along with the procedure of [case-1]. Compare 
the newly estimated value of k with initial or just previously estimated values. 
(v) If both are coincident with the same value, regard the newly estimated value as required 
estimation result. Otherwise using new estimate of k, iterate the procedure (ii) to (v) till the 
newly estimated values coincides with immediate past estimated values. 
 
 In both cases 1 and 2, the initial estimate of k is very important, because such initial value decide 
the adjusted money rmadj,t  in which directly can give us parameter estimation of VAR or VEC 
model in OLS.  All parameters thus obtained are used as initial conditions of nonlinear 
optimization in (8).  In order to obtain initial estimate of k, we consider the restricted cointegration 
detection.  In case 2, we assume there are two cointegrating vector (i.e., stationary vector).  The 
first one is constructed with (rmadj,t, yt, rt, DV1t). The second stationary vector is DV1t. The first 
cointegrating vector has a form: 
 
                 ectt= rmadj,t +a1 yt +a2 rt +a3 DV1t                                                                         (9) 
 
The parameters in long-run relation are adopted as initial estimate of k, that is , 
 
                                         k = - a3                                                                                          (10) 
 
The parameter k in Eqs.(5) to (7) are estimated in the interval (1980q1, 2003q2) and are given 
below: 
 
          Precautionary Demand ≡ 0.0141 DV1t                                                                                        (11) 
 
 rmadj,t ≡ rmt – 0.0141 DV1t                                                                              (12) 
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